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Part III: International and Comparative Law Issues
Splicing Morality and Patent Law:
Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men
Cynthia M. Ho*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether ethics and morality have a place in U.S.
patent law has been resurrected by the filing of a patent application
involving "chimeric embryos" that contain both human and non-
human cells.' Although the application itself is confidential in
accordance with present patent laws,2 the subject matter of the
application was publicized by biotechnology activist Jeremy Rifkin,
who filed the application in conjunction with cell biologist Stuart
Newman (Newman application).3 In fact, they filed the application to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. The author
thanks Susan Kuo for her advice and support in the preparation of this Article, and Kelly
Tautges for her able research assistance.
1. See Morality Aspect of Utility Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human
Inventions, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 555, 556 (1998) [hereinafter Morality
Requirement] (noting that since the 1993 issuance of additional mouse patents, calls for
moratoriums and the broader debate over patents on life forms had largely subsided until news
of the Newman application).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994). Although this provision was recently amended such that some
patent applications will be published and, thus, publicly available, it is not retroactive and does
not apply to this case. See Domestic Publication of Foreign Filed Patent Applications Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
3. See, e.g., David Dickson, Legal Fight Looms Over Patent Bid on Human/Animal
Chimaeras, 1998 NATURE 423. See also Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human
Creatures; Scientist Seeks to Touch OffEthics Debate, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12. The
application is referred to as the "Newman application" here because news sources consistently
report Newman as an inventor of the application, but the sources are conflicting with regard to
whether Rifkin is a co-inventor or a partial assignee of an interest in the application. See, e.g.,
Thomas D. Mays, Biotech Incites Outcry, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at Cl (stating that
Newman is the inventor and Rifkin is a co-applicant); Rick Meredith, How Will Provocative
Application Fare in the PTO?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1998, at C32 (stating that Rifkin and
Newman jointly applied for the patent); Weiss, supra, at A12 (stating that Newman has
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prevent others from creating what they considered to be immoral and
to at least engender discussion and debate concerning whether such
embryos should be patentable.
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) immediately reacted by
releasing a "media advisory" concerning its position on the same day
that the application became publicized. The advisory stated that "the
PTO fully applies the law without discriminating against a particular
field of technology" and that patents are not granted unless they
"meet the strict patentability requirements set forth in patent laws."6
It further stated that:
[T]he courts have interpreted the utility requirement to exclude
inventions deemed to be "injurious to the well being, good
policy, or good morals of society. .....
It is the position of the PTO that inventions directed to
human/non-human chimera could, under certain
circumstances, not be patentable because, among other things,
they would fail to meet the public policy and morality aspects
of the utility requirement.7
In noting that there existed "public policy and morality aspects" of
the utility requirement, the PTO was resurrecting and relying on the
doctrine of "moral utility." This doctrine is based on dicta from the
assigned Rifkin co-ownership).
4. Weiss, supra note 3, at A12. They hope to use the rights granted under a patent to
exclude others from creating such human hybrids. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (defining patent
infringement); id. § 281 (providing for infringement remedy); id. § 283 (providing for
injunctive relief to prevent infringement).
5. Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to
Humans (visited Apr. 1, 1998) <http:lwww.uspto.gov/web/officestcomlspeeches98-06.htm>
[hereinafter Media Advisory].
6. Media Advisory, supra note 5. The "strict patentability requirements" referred to are
that the invention (1) constitutes patentable subject matter and (2) meets the technical
requirements for patentability, which require the invention to be new, useful, nonobvious, and
timely filed. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994). In addition, the application must comport with
additional requirements concerning the contents of the application, as well as formalities with
filing. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-112 (1994).
7. Media Advisory, supra note 5 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 2:247
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1817 case Lowell v. Lewis.8 Although courts once relied on "moral
utility" to deny patent protection for inventions used solely for
gambling or fraud, no court has relied on this doctrine since the PTO
Board of Appeals held that an invention used solely for gambling
could be patentable in the 1977 decision of Ex parte Murphy.9
Although courts have relied on Lowell in recent years, it is quoted
primarily for the principle that inventions of specious utility are not
patentable, rather than for the doctrine of moral utility.10 In fact,
courts have not raised moral utility as a bar to patentability even for
inventions designed to circumvent the law." Nonetheless, then PTO
Commissioner Bruce Lehman characterized the position in the media
advisory as consistent with the PTO's long-standing policy.12 In
addition, he noted the necessity of the statement to make clear that
"there will be no patents on monsters, at least not while I'm
commissioner."
13
Despite the PTO's initial suggestion that it would invoke the
moral utility doctrine to reject the Newman application, it apparently
abandoned that approach. Instead, the PTO rejected the application
8. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). The case
concerned the patentability of a water pump for which no issues of morality were noted. See id.
passim.
9. Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (Bd. Pat App. & Int. 1977) (noting that
while gambling could be considered injurious to public morals, there was no justification for
denying a patent on a gambling device based on lack of utility and stating that the PTO should
not dictate a morality standard through the utility requirement). No court has relied upon
Lowell for the moral utility principle during the latter half of the Twentieth Century. See infra
note 10 and accompanying text. See also DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.03
(1999) (noting that the policy is a narrow one); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher
Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1062-66
(1988) (discussing earlier cases that relied on moral utility doctrine to preclude patentability
where inventions were perceived as involving either fraud or gambling devices).
10. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that an invention designed to deceive consumers is not invalid for lack of utility and
further stating that "the principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to
serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in recent years"); Tol-O-Matic,
Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Lowell in discussion of whether piston-cylinder patent was invalid for lack of utility
because there was a "total incapacity," without addressing issues concerning morality).
11. Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1886 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (declining to find that the patented radar detector lacked utility even though the
invention's primary purpose was to circumvent law enforcement attempts).
12. Morality Requirement, supra note 1, at 556.
13. Id.
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for failing to claim statutory subject matter. t4 In particular, the PTO
asserted that because the application improperly claimed a human
being, it failed to claim patentable subject matter.15
This appears to be the first instance in which the PTO has rejected
an application for improperly claiming a human being, although it
had suggested that it would do so as early as 1987.16 At that time, the
PTO issued a statement clarifying that it considered "nonnaturally
occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter."17 However, the PTO
qualified this statement by noting that "a claim directed to or
including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."8 The PTO
obliquely supported this exclusion by stating that "[t]he grant of a
limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited
by the Constitution.' 19
14. See Patent Application is Disallowed as 'Embracing' Human Being, 58 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 203 (1999) [hereinafter Application Disallowed]; Rick Weiss,
U.S. Ruling Aids Opponent of Patents for Life Forms, WASH. POST, June 17, 1999, at A2. It
should be noted that the PTO rejection is based on info provided by Rifkin & Neuman to the
media.
15. See Application Disallowed, supra note 14. The PTO apparently asserted in its office
action that:
[t]he claimed invention is not considered to be patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. [§] 101 because the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed
inventions as a whole embraces a human being .... (A]pplicant's claimed invention...
is not limited to non-humans but rather includes within its scope a human being and as
such falls outside the scope of protection under 35 U.S.C. [§] 101.
Id. at 203.
16. Although the PTO has not had to address the issue of claiming a human being head-
on, it has been forecast by an earlier debate concerning transgenic animal patents. See, e.g., The
Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990, H.R. 5598, 101st Cong.
(1990) (proposing to amend § 101 of the Patent Act to state "except that human beings are not
patentable subject matter"). See also Russell H. Walker, Note, Patent Law-Should Genetically
Engineered Human Beings Be Patentable?, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 116 (1991)
(suggesting that Congress enact a new definitional section of the patent code that defines a
"human being").
17. Patent and Trademark Office, Animals-Patentability, 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE
24(1987).
18. Id.
19. Id. The PTO assertion regarding the constitutional prohibition was made without any
specific reference to the Constitution. Id. Nonetheless, it recommended that claims directed to
non-plant multicellular organisms should explicitly exclude humans from claims to avoid a
rejection. Id. In fact, the first transgenic animal patent issued explicitly excluded humans from
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The constitutional reference was widely presumed to refer to the
Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude and
was criticized for failure to justify the exclusion of humans from
patents.20 In particular, it was noted that patents provide only a right
to exclude and not an affirmative right to use an invention, let alone
possess it. However, the constitutional basis, if any, for precluding
patents on humans was overshadowed by the more immediate
concerns of whether transgenic animals-which were already
scientifically possible-should be patentable.
The PTO may now have re-evaluated its prior reliance on the
Constitution for excluding claims to humans as unpatentable subject
matter. Although the PTO has not officially rescinded its prior
statement, its recent rejection of the Newman application did not
raise constitutional concerns. Rather, the PTO asserted that the
Newman application claimed non-statutory subject matter because
"Congress did not intend 35 U.S.C. [§] 101 to include the patenting
of human beings., 21 However, this argument was previously rejected
by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty.22 In particular, the Court
stated that:
its claims. Philip Leder & Timothy Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. PAT. No.
4,736,866 (1988) (claiming a "transgenic non-human mammal" whose cells contained an
activated oncogene in the broadcast issued claim) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost
Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1647-58 (1993) (questioning whether either the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendments provide valid legal justification for the PTO's assertion that
patenting transgenic humans or embryos would be unconstitutional and noting that the
constitutional basis for finding embryos unpatentable is particularly questionable as they may
not fit well within the requirement of a "person"); Kevin D. DeBr6, Note, Patents on People
and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or Enslaving Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
221 (1989); Rachel E. Fishman, Note, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures
Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461 (1989).
21. Application Disallowed, supra note 14, at 204. The PTO's deputy assistant
commissioner for patent policy, Stephen Kunin, is noted to have said that the PTO believes that
Congress did not intend to allow patents on humans or on creatures that are essentially human
when it enacted the Patent Act. Weiss, supra note 14, at A2.
22. D Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 314-15 (1980) (dismissing the suggestion
that microorganisms cannot qualify as patentable subject matter under § 101 because Congress
could not have foreseen genetic technology at the time it enacted the Patent Act). See also
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting
argument that plants are not patentable because they were not intended to be included in the
patent system).
2000]
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[t]his Court frequently has observed that a statute is not to be
confined to the 'particular application[s] ... contemplated by
the legislators.' This is especially true in the field of patent
law.... Congress employed broad language in drafting § 101
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable. z3
The United States Patent Act does not exclude any particular
inventions from the scope of patentable subject matter. 4 In addition,
the patent laws consistently have been broadly interpreted with
regard to the scope of patentable subject matter. Although the PTO
may be of a different opinion, its opinion does not have the force of
law. This is because the PTO is charged with administering the patent
laws, not with the creation of new law or the interpretation of existing
law.2
6
However, even if the present patent laws allow chimeras such as
the one in the Newman application to constitute patentable subject
matter, the application nonetheless raises the important issue of
whether inventions that some consider immoral or unethical should
23. Chakrabary, 447 U.S. at 315-16 (citations omitted).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. The only categories of subject matter "excluded" from
patentability are those that fail to rise to the level of an invention such as laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In its
first office action rejecting the Newman application, the PTO conceded that an invention that
"embraces" a human being is not within a category the Supreme Court considered excluded in
Chakrabarty. See Application Disallowed, supra note 14, at 204.
25. See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d at 1376
(noting that the patent policy fosters application to all areas of subject matter in holding that
patents could be properly considered statutory subject matter under the utility patent act despite
other available forms of legal protection); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172
F.3d 1352, 1357-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that method of indicating a telephone call
recipient's primary interexchange carrier could constitute a process and accordingly constitute
patentable subject matter); State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the repetitive use of the term "any" in
§ 101 indicates Congressional intent not to place any restrictions on subject matter beyond
those cited in the section); Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Int. 1987) (restating and applying Chakrabarty reasoning to find that genetically engineered
oyster was patentable subject matter).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (noting that the Commissioner of the PTO shall perform all
duties required by law with respect to the granting and issuing of patents and that the
Commissioner may establish regulations for the conduct of proceedings within the PTO). The
PTO implicitly acknowledged its limited authority in its Media Advisory concerning the
Newman application by stating that it "is charged with the responsibility of administering the
patent laws of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and other courts." Media
Advisory, supra note 5.
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be patentable. This issue will persist in the wake of new advances in
biotechnology, regardless of the PTO's action on the Newman
application.27 Rapid advances in biotechnology seem to outstrip the
public comfort level with the use of such technology. 28 Moreover,
availability of patents for controversial technology seems to create
further controversy and public unease.
29
The present debate concerning the place of ethics within the
patent system mirrors the previous controversy that ensued, following
the PTO's first grant of a patent on a transgenic animal in 1988.30
27. Even if the Newman application is considered patentable subject matter, a patent may
still be denied for failure to meet the technical requirements of patentability. See supra note 6.
In fact, it has been reported that the first PTO office action on this application preliminarily
rejected the application as not only claiming non-statutory subject matter but also for failing to
meet several technical requirements, including failure to make enabling and best mode
disclosures under § 112, and anticipation under § 102(b). Application Disallowed, supra note
14, at 204.
28. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Legal, Ethical and Social Concerns in the Debate over
Stem-Cell Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 29, 1999, at B4; Peter Kendall, The Beast in
the Dish: Lab Grows a Scientific and Ethical Quandry, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1998, at Cl. See
also Rick Weiss, A Cloning Claim 's Controversies, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1998, at A3 (noting
that scientists, ethicists and federal regulators are "scramb[ling] to sort out the many
controversial issues raised by [cloning]").
29. Although a patent does not create an affirmative right to use or constitute an
endorsement by the government of the technology, confusion often arises from a
misunderstanding that patents create such a right. See, e.g., infra Part II (noting this problem in
the context of discussing the analogous issue within the European patent system). Nonetheless,
because patent protection can provide an economic incentive for research and development,
patents may raise ethical issues in situations where the necessary funding for research is
available from other sources. This is in fact the case with research on stem cells, the primitive
cells that become every other type of cells. Although federal funding is banned for such
research, it has continued through the funding of private corporations, anticipating that patent
protection will provide a return on their investment. See Lori P. Knowles, Property, Progeny
and Patents, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 38 (1999) (discussing research concerning stems cells
derived from aborted fetues by Geron and the related patent and policy issues); Eliot Marshall,
A Versatile Cell Line Raises Scientific Hopes, Legal Questions: Stem Cells, 1998 ScI. 1014
(discussing a research group in the area of stem cells that plans to license related patents to the
Geron Corp. to finance the research because of the possible implications of the public funding
ban); Mara Bovsun, Stem Cell Studies Raise Hope for Human Patch Kits, BIOTECH.
NEWSWATCH, Nov. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8766021 (noting that university research
was sponsored by private funding because government money was unavailable); Antonio
Regalado, The Troubled Hunt for the Ultimate Cell: Studies on the Human Embryonic Stem
Cell, TECH. REV., July 17, 1998, at 34. See also Act of Nov. 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-78,
§ 513(a), I ll Stat. 1517 (1997).
30. See, e.g., S. 2169, 101st Cong. (1990) (proposing five-year moratorium on patenting
of genetically engineered animals); H.R. 3247, 101st Cong. (1989) (proposing two-year
moratorium on patenting transgenic animals). See also ANIMAL PATENTS: THE LEGAL,
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Public controversy concerning such patents led to a number of
legislative proposals to limit the scope of patentable subject matter,
including one proposal to explicitly exclude "human beings" from
patentability.31  It is foreseeable that Congress will revisit prior
proposals, or propose new legislation to limit patentable subject
matter in light of the fact that proposals to restrict the scope of
patentable subject matter often follow public controversy.32 Perhaps
more importantly, it is foreseeable that Congress may give undue
consideration to the approach of other patent systems which appear
on their face of accommodate morality.
This is particularly true because Congress is obligated to amend
the patent laws within the confines of the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS agreement).33
ECONOMIC AND SociAL ISSUES (William H. Lesser ed., 1989) (discussing legal and social
issues concerning transgenic animal patents); Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in
Patenting New Animal Life, 28 JURIMETRICS 399, 405-24 (1988) (containing an in-depth
discussion of ethical arguments concerning the patenting of higher life forms, with a focus on
transgenic animals).
31. See The Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990, H.R
5598, 101st Cong. (proposing to amend § 101 of the Patent Act to state "except that human
beings are not patentable subject matter"); S. 2111, 100th Cong. (1988) (proposing that animals
be unpatentable inventions).
32. In the early part of the Nineteenth Century, in an era when medicine was largely
unregulated, attempts were made to exclude medical procedures, as well as medical devices.
See H.R. 12451, 57th Cong. (1902) ("prohibiting patents on any "art" of treating human disease
... or upon any device adapted to be used in treatment of human disease....'); William D.
Noonan, Patenting Medical Inventions, PHAROS, Summer 1990, at 708. More recently, there
was a renewed effort to exclude medical procedures from the scope of the Patent Act in
response to a strong medical lobby asserting that doctors should not be liable for infringement
of medical procedure patents. See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act, H..
1127, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995).
Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act and Inventor Protection Act of 1995:
Hearings on H.R. 1127 and H.R. 2419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995); Public Hearing on
Patent Protection For Therapeutic and Diagnostic Methods (Dep't Commerce May 2, 1996)
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/diaghear.txt>. Although these efforts did
not ultimately alter the scope of patentable subject matter, the legislation Congress did enact
deprives medical procedure patent owners from any remedies against doctors who infringe and
may thus make the scope of patentable subject matter an empty promise for such inventions.
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. 1111997).
33. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 1, 33
LL.M. 1125 (1994); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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Although TRIPS generally requires patent protection to be equally
available for all inventions without regard to subject matter, it does
allow some important exceptions; one such exception is that subject
matter may be denied patentability if its commercial exploitation
would violate "ordre public" or morality.34 The scope of this
exception has not been conclusively determined. However, because it
mirrors the language of other patent systems, those systems thus
become relevant in evaluating the interplay between morality and
patentability. The two primary sources for such an evaluation are the
European Patent Convention (EPC)35 and the European Union's
Directive on Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions
(Biotechnology Directive).36
This Article seeks to advance the discussion of the proper role of
ethics and morality in the United States patent system by examining
existing models of incorporating ethics into the context of
patentability. In particular, a detailed examination of the European
system, is undertaken to determine whether morality can be
adequately considered within patent law. Part II of this Article
discusses the existing framework for considering morality within the
EPC, including interpretation of article 53(a) by the European Patent
Office (EPO) and its related courts. Part III of this Article considers
the place of morality within future frameworks of patentability. In
particular, the Biotechnology Directive is considered and applied to
the Newman application to illustrate interpretative difficulties with
the Directive. Moreover, this section addresses the implications of the
existing frameworks, including the difficulties in their creation and
application, for the United States. This section suggests that although
morality has a place in other patent systems, that place stands on
tenuous ground. At a minimum, existing systems that attempt to
34. Id. art. 27.
35. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter
EPC].
36. Council Directive 98/44 on Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998
O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Directive]. Member states should be in compliance with the
Directive by July 20, 2000. Id. However, it should also be noted that the Biotechnology
Directive is presently subject to legal challenge by several member countries. Case C-377/78,
Netherlands v. Parliament, 1998 O.J. (C 378) 13; A. Scott, The Dutch Challenge to the Bio-
patenting Directive, 4 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 212 (1999); P. Farrant & V. Salmon,
Netherlands Seeks End to EU Biotech Directive, IP WORLDWIDE, July/Aug. 1999, at 3.
2000]
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incorporate morality into patent laws should not be followed blindly.
Part IV concludes by noting that prior models for incorporating
morality into the patent system underscore the fact that inclusion of
morality within the patent laws does not necessarily resolve morality
issues and may instead just create new ones. Accordingly, this part
suggests that the use of controversial technologies should be
addressed directly, rather than indirectly and ineffectively through the
patent system.
II. EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR CONSIDERING MORALITY
A. European Patent Convention Article 53(a)
In examining existing frameworks for considering morality in the
context of the patent laws, the EPC37 is the principle source to
consult. Unlike the United States' Patent Act, article 53(a) of the EPC
explicitly mandates that morality be considered in determining
patentability. The EPC states that patents shall not be granted for
"inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be
contrary to 'ordre public' or morality, provided that the exploitation
shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited
by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States .... "38
Neither "ordre public" or morality are defined within the EPC.39 The
EPO's Guidelines for Substantive Examination provided to patent
37. The European Patent convention enables patent applicants to obtain a bundle of
national patents in multiple member countries through the filing of a single application with the
EPO. See EPC, supra note 35, art. 64(1) (providing that EP patent will have the same effect as a
patent issued by a national patent office). These national patents are then subject to the
enforcement laws of individual states. In determining whether a patent should issue, the EPO
considers whether inventions are new, "susceptible of industrial application," and involve an
"inventive step." See EPC, supra note 35, art. 52(l). These EPC requirements are considered to
be roughly analogous to the U.S. requirements that a patentable invention be new, useful and
obvious. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 27(1)(1).
38. EPC, art. 53(a), supra note 35, at 286. The national laws of all member states to the
EPC incorporate similar prohibitions. See, e.g., Patents Act § 1(3)(a) (U.K.) 1977 (stating that a
patent will not be granted for "an invention the publication or exploitation of which would be
generally expected to encourage offensive, immoral or anti-social behaviour"). Although the
wording is slightly different, the U.K. Patents Act is intended to be interpreted similarly to the
EPC. See id. preamble; see also Amanda Warren, A Mouse in Sheep's Clothing: The Challenge
to the Patent Morality Criterion Posed by "Dolly, " 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 445 (1998).
39. See EPC, supra note 35, art. 53(a).
256 [Vol. 2:247
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examiners explain that the provision only should be invoked in "rare
and extreme cases.",40 However, the sole example cited in the
Guidelines of such a "rare and extreme case" is a letter-bomb.41
Given the ambiguity of article 53(a), as well as the minimal guidance
to patent examiners, it is not surprising that relatively few cases exist
in which article 53(a) is considered, despite the existence of the
provision since the creation of the EPC in 1973.42 Nonetheless, the
cases that do exist are useful in examining how considerations of
morality within the patent system are applied in practice.
B. Judicial Interpretations ofArticle 53(a)
1. The Harvard Onco-mouse
The first time EPO courts considered article 53(a) was in the
context of a patent application filed by Harvard University
concerning transgenic mammals. The inventors had already been
granted a United States patent in 1988. Like its United States
counterpart, the EPO application claimed a transgenic non-human
mammal susceptible to cancer.43 Although the application claimed to
be applicable to all mammals, the disclosed data primarily described
the use of activated oncogenes in mice and thus the invention was
referred to as the Harvard Onco-mouse.
The EPO initially rejected the application for reasons unrelated to
morality. The EPO rejected the application as improper subject
matter in light of the EPC prohibition against patenting animal
"varieties," as well as the fact that the disclosure concerning mice did
not support claims to mammals. The Examining Division of the EPO
initially noted that "ethical questions need to be considered" in light
of U.S. controversy concerning animal patents that followed the
40. European Patent Office, Guidelines for Substantive Examination, Part C, Chapter IV,
§ 3.1 (visited Mar. 7, 2000) <http://www.european-patent-office.org/guidelinestenglish/
c iv_3.htm>.
41. Id.
42. In fact, in most of the published opinions in which article 53(a) is at issue, those who
opposed a patent raised the issue, not the EPO. See, e.g., Relaxin, 1995 O.J. EPO 388; Plant
Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, T356/93-3.3.4, 1995 O.J. EPO 545 [hereinafter PGS].
43. Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 E.P.O.R 4 [hereinafter Onco-mouse]; Leder & Stuart,
supra note 19.
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issuance of the first U.S. patent on transgenic mammals.44 However,
it ultimately concluded that "patent law is not the right legislative
tool" for asking such questions-at least in the case where the
invention was perceived to have a possible beneficial effect on
mankind.45
The Technical Board of Appeal (TBA), on the other hand,
determined that it was in fact necessary to consider and apply article
53(a). The TBA's determination was likely influenced by what it
referred to as "considerable [public] interest" in the application,
including interest in- the genetic manipulation of animals in general.46
After determining that no per se exclusion to patenting transgenic
animals existed under a separate EPC provision limiting patentability,
the TBA stated that:
precisely in a case of this kind there are compelling reasons to
consider the implications of article 53(a) EPC in relation to the
question of patentability. The genetic manipulation of
mammalian animals is undeniably problematic in various
respects, particularly where activated oncogenes are inserted to
make an animal abnormally sensitive to carcinogenic
substances and stimuli and consequently prone to develop
tumours, which necessarily cause suffering. There is also a
danger that genetically manipulated animals, if released into
the environment, might entail enforceable and irreversible
adverse effects. Misgivings and fears of this kind have been
expressed by a number of persons who have filed observations
with the Board .... Considerations of precisely this kind have
44. Id. at 10-11. The Examining Division perceived that the grant of the corresponding
U.S. patent to have resulted in "severe criticism," citing hearings discussing the ethical
ramifications and legislative proposals on this topic. Id. at 11. In addition, the Examining
Division cited specific questions that were considered at the oral proceedings regarding
concerns with respect to article 53(a): whether using non-animal models in cancer tests was
desirable, the fact that the invention was aimed at producing tumors in the test animals, rather
than aimed at improving any specific feature, the fact that animals were regarded as an "object,"
the potential danger that descendants of transgenic mammals could escape and disrupt
evolution. Id.
45. Id. at 11.
46. See id. at 507 (noting this based on the "large number of observations by third parties"
that were filed pursuant to EPC rules which allow for participation by those without a legal
interest in the patent application).
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also led a number of Contracting States to impose legislative
control on genetic engineering. The decision as to whether or
not article 53(a) EPC is a bar to patenting the present invention
would seem to depend mainly on a careful weighing up of the
suffering of animals and possible risks to the environment on
the one hand, and the invention's usefulness to mankind on the
other. It is the task of the department of first instance to
consider these matters in the context of its resumed
examination of the case.47
On remand, the Examining Division considered the Onco-mouse
application in light of article 53(a), as ordered by the TBA. Before
stating its opinion on the application of article 53(a), the Examining
Division noted that "[i]n view of the extraordinary attention the
present case has attracted from the public and the importance the
public attaches to the question of patenting animals in light of public
order and morality,... the Examining Division considers it
appropriate to make a statement on its position concerning these
questions." 48 The Examining Division noted several patent law
principles it considered essential to applying article 53(a):
(1) a patent only provides a right to exclude others, rather than
an affirmative right to use; thus, use of the patented invention
may be governed and limited by other laws;
(2) the EPC recognizes a general principle of patentability such
that EPC provisions restricting patentable subject matter
should be interpreted narrowly;
(3) new technology is "normally afflicted with new risks, ...
experience has also shown that these risks should not generally
lead to a negative attitude vis-d-vis new technologies but rather
to a careful weighing up of the risks on the one hand and the
positive aspects on the other and that the result of this
47. Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 E.P.O.R. 501, 513 [hereinafter Onco-mouse II]. The TBA
also confirmed that there was no bar to patent animals under article 53(b), which provides a bar
to animal "varieties." Id. at 510-12.
48. Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1991 E.P.O.R. 525, 526 [hereinafter Onco-mouse Il].
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consideration should be the determining factor in whether a
new technology should be used or not.
' 4 9
As mandated by the TBA, the Examining Division balanced the
factors established by the TBA to determine whether the Onco-mouse
invention violated article 53(a). In particular, it considered (1) the
utility to mankind in remedying "widespread and dangerous
diseases;" (2) the possibility of cruelty to animals; and (3) the
possibility of uncontrolled release of unwanted genes into the
environment.50 The Examining Division found that the Onco-mouse
did not violate article 53(a) as the invention's "usefulness to mankind
cannot be denied;" this statement was based on the perception that
the invention could lead to development of methods for treating one
of the most frequent causes of death and thus benefit all of
mankind.51 In addition, the Examining Division determined that
cruelty to animals could be considered reduced overall as fewer
research animals would be needed using the invention, as compared
to traditional methods.52  Moreover, it considered unwanted
environmental release to be a minamal risk that would only occur in
cases of intentional misuse or blatant ignorance. 53 In addition, it
commented that exclusion from patentability would not be justified
merely because technology was dangerous and emphasized that
regulation of dangerous material was within the scope of other
49. Onco-mouse I11, 1991 E.P.O.R. at 527.
If higher life forms are involved in the new technology it is not only the risk which
must be considered but also the possible harm which is done to such higher life forms.
This leads one to the question of morality.... [F]or each individual invention the
question of morality has to be examined and possible detrimental effects and risks
have to be weighed and balanced against the merits and advantages aimed at.
Id. at 527. In addition, the court noted that "[if the legislator is of the opinion that certain
technical knowledge should be used under limited conditions only it is up to him to enact
appropriate legislation." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Onco-mouse 11I, 1991 E.P.D.RL at 528. In particular, the Examining Division
considered it relevant in the Onco-mouse case to consider that, according to the scientific
community, there were no equivalent alternatives as reliable as the Onco-mouse. See id. at 527-
28 (noting that "it is clear that in cancer research animal test models are at present considered
indispensable" and that onco-mice, in particular, are a "powerful tool with which co-operating
genes in tumorigenesis can be identified").
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government bodies, rather than the EPO.54
However, the implications of the Onco-mouse decision may be
limited. First, the Examining Division expressly cautioned that its
considerations applied solely to the Onco-mouse application and that
a different conclusion could conceivably be reached in applying
article 53(a) to other cases of transgenic animals.55 In addition,
although the Examining Division appeared to easily resolve the issue
in favor of patentability, public controversy continued; the EPO
remained embroiled in a debate concerning the application of article
53(a) to the Onco-mouse because of the substantial number of
oppositions filed against the issued patent.56 Accordingly, the EPO
may be disinclined to grant patents on other transgenic animals.
2. Plant Genetic System's Herbicide Resistant (Transgenic) Plant
a. Opposition Division of the EPO
Article 53(a) was next raised as an issue by Greenpeace during
opposition proceedings to a patent on a transgenic plant. 7 As one
ground for its request to invalidate the plant patent, Greenpeace
argued that the grant of a patent for plant life forms and the
exploitation of such a patent runs per se contrary to morality and/or
ordre public.5 8 Greenpeace also alleged that a violation of article
54. Id. at 528.
55. Id. In fact, a transgenic animal genetically modified to lose its hair and, thus, useful in
the study of human baldness, was considered to have failed the balancing test of article 53(a)
when the EPO warned Upjohn that it would not allow such an application. See, e.g., Robin
Nott, The Biotech Directive: Does Europe Need a New Draft?, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
563, 565-66 (1995) (comparing the Upjohn-mouse with the Onco-mouse in criticizing
application of article 53(a) as arbitrary because the degree that the animals suffered was
identical); Steve Conner, Patent Ban on Baldness 'Cure'Mouse, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb.
2, 1992, at 5.
56. See, e.g., Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Andreas Schrell, The 'Harvard Onco-mouse' in
the Opposition Proceedings Before the European Patent Office, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
345 (1993).
57. Greenpeace UK v. Plant Genetic Systems N.V. (Opposition Div. EPO 1992), reported
in 24 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 618 (1993) [hereinafter Plant Genetic
Systems].
58. Greenpeace alleged that the patent's claimed second generation transgenic plants were
improper because they did not constitute an invention under article 52 of the EPC. Id. at 619. In
addition, Greenpeace argued that plants and processes for their production are per se
unpatentable under article 53(b). Id. at 624-25. The Opposition Division rejected both of these
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53(a) was established pursuant to the Onco-mouse balancing test
because the environmental risks from the release of any genetically-
engineered organisms, including the Plant Genetic Systems' (PGS)
invention, would be "incalculably great."
59
Before addressing the appropriate standard by which to apply
article 53(a), the Opposition Division explained some basic concepts
of patent law. The Opposition Division emphasized the fundamental
concept that a patent does not provide an affirmative and unfettered
right to use an invention, as the Examining Division had noted in the
Onco-mouse case.60 In particular, the Opposition Division stated that
a patent does not confer a positive right to use an invention;
exploitation of the patent is always subject to regulation by
governmental agencies where appropriate (for example, the
patenting of a potential novel medicament has no bearing on
whether it will be approved for administration to patients or
not, nor does the grant of a patent for a plant imply that it will
be approved for field trials, let alone for large-scale industrial
use). As the Opponent is aware, the grant of a patent is
completely independent of the existence of possible
restrictions on the use of the patented invention; moreover,
denying a patent does not in itself prevent an invention being
exploited.61
The Opposition Division also briefly discussed its perception of
the policy behind patent protection to address Greenpeace's
contention that the patent conferred an improper reward in the case of
immoral subject matter. The Opposition Division noted that the
primary reason for patents is to promote innovative research and that
patent law was not intended to influence the types of research to be
carried out.62 The Opposition Division further stated that any attempt
to utilize patent law in such a way would inappropriately deny a
patent on ethical grounds in seeming disregard of the literal language
grounds. See id.
59. Id. at 620.
60. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 57, at 620.
62. Id.
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of EPC article 53(a), which expressly allows denials of patent based
on ethical grounds and, furthermore, that such a denial would not
necessarily prevent commercial exploitation.
63
The Opposition Division rejected Greenpeaces' proposition that
the balancing exercise set forth in the Harvard Onco-mouse case was
necessary to determine whether article 53(a) was violated. The
Opposition Division noted that "Harvard does not supercede the
general approach that article 53(a) is to be invoked only in rare and
extreme cases but should be regarded as an exceptional case relating
only to the patenting of animals ... used as test models[,] ... where
suffering is unavoidable."64 The Opposition Division noted that
article 53(a) "has only very seldom been invoked and its function has
to be seen as a measure to ensure that patents would not be granted
for inventions which would universally be regarded as outrageous. 65
Although the Opposition Division did not articulate when the
provision has been invoked for such outrageous inventions, it seemed
to easily conclude that the invention in this case was not so
outrageous. Its decision appeared influenced, at least in part, by the
fact that the EPO Board of Appeal had previously affirmed the
patentability of transgenic plants without raising issues of morality.66
The Opposition Division rejected Greenpeace's proposition that
an overwhelming majority of the public must favor exploitation of
the invention for it to be patentable. 67 Instead, it noted that except
where the Onco-mouse test is applicable, the relevant test for
evaluating article 53(a) is whether an "overwhelming consensus"
would be opposed to the exploitation of the invention as immoral.6 8
63. Id.
64. Id. at 621 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 57, at 623-24 (stating that "[t]here is no
requirement in the EPC that patents may only be granted for inventions regarded as desirable by
a majority of the public"). Inventions need not be desirable by a majority of the public to be
patentable since to do so would be contrary to the general principle of patentability. Id. Also,
the Opposition Division noted that the public is similarly incapable of assessing objective
morality. Id. at 624.
68. Id. at 624 (noting that the prohibition under article 53(a) only existed in "very limited
cases in which there is an overwhelming consensus that the exploitation of an invention would
be immoral .. ") (emphasis in original); see also id. at 624 (noting that the only ethical
consideration is whether the invention belongs to "that extreme category of inventions which
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Moreover, it noted that the language of article 53(a) itself suggests
that an invention should not be precluded from patentability merely
because it is objectionable to some member of society.69
The Opposition Division determined that Greenpeace did not
present sufficient evidence to establish that an overwhelming
consensus would oppose the patented invention.70 The evidence
presented by Greenpeace included a survey showing that over 80% of
Swedish farmers opposed the patenting of genetically-engineered,
herbicide-resistant plants, such as the patented invention.7' The
Opposition Division determined that this survey did not establish that
the public in all contracting states would oppose the patent; thus, the
survey failed to establish article 53(a) preclusion.72 In addition, the
Division found that the survey, as well as a public opinion poll, did
not constitute objective evidence.73 Rather, the Opposition Division
characterized Greenpeace to only have presented "abstract ethical and
moral arguments." 74
In addition, the Opposition Division noted the practical difficulties
with attempting to apply article 53(a). In particular, while it
articulated that objective evidence was required to establish a bar
under article 53(a), it also acknowledged that there is often no
consensus on what constitutes objective morality.75 In addition, it
recognized that information concerning commercial exploitation
necessary to make the determination would typically be unavailableS• 76
during the course of usual patent examination. Moreover, even if
such information were available, the Opposition Division questioned
whether patent examiners were properly qualified to examine ethical
could be regarded as so abhorrent to the vast majority of the public as to render the granting of a
patent inconceivable").
69. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 57, at 621, 624.
70. Id. at 623.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. In particular, the Opposition Division considered the objection that the
environmental risks rendered exploitation of the invention unethical to be unsubstantiated. Id. at
622. It also dismissed environmental risks as traditionally irrelevant to determination of
patentability and more appropriate for regulation by bodies other than the EPO. Plant Genetic
Systems, supra note 57, at 621.
74. Id. at 624.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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information when their expertise is in technical areas; it found that
particularly true in a case such as this where it perceived that there
would likely be a "huge divergence of opinion" even among ethical
specialists.
77
Although it concluded that article 53(a) did not bar patentability in
this case, the Opposition Division nonetheless reflected on what it
perceived to be a tension between the application of article 53(a) and
the nature of opposition proceedings. It asserted that opposition
proceedings were not a proper context for determining moral
questions such as the pros and cons of genetically engineered
plants.78 Moreover, it noted that because information concerning
commercial exploitation would likely not be available until the time
of opposition proceedings, article 53(a) issues would likely arise only
with regard to publicly visible patents that were attached by special
interest groups.
79
b. Board of Appeals
Before addressing whether the patent violated article 53(a), the
Board of Appeals first attempted to define the key terms of the article
and set forth general principles concerning the application of article
53(a).80 Although the Board acknowledged the difficulty in
determining whether claimed subject matter would violate article
53(a), it noted that article 53(a) could not be disregarded.8' The Board
also noted that finding an invention illegal in a particular nation
would not per se constitute a bar under article 53(a).82 Similarly, it
determined that living matter was not per se improper under article
53(a). 3 The Board stated that a proper interpretation of the history of
77. Id. at 620-21.
78. Id. at 624.
79. Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 57, at 621.
80. PGS, 1995 O.J. EPO at 557. In particular, it noted that there were no European
definitions of "morality" and "ordre public" contemplated by those who drafted the EPC. Id.
(citing document IV/2767161-E, at 7). The Board's attempt at defining the key terms will be
discussed in connection with the Board's application of the morality and ordre public
provisions separately.
8 1. Id. at 560.
82. Id. at 558.
83. Id. at 559 (basing its determination on both historical evidence and case law that
patents can be granted on plants and animals).
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the EPC required that patentability be given the broadest possible
interpretation; exceptions to patentability have been interpreted
narrowly and article 53(a) should be as well. 4
(1) Morality of Invention
The Board initially addressed the definition of the key term
"morality" as the first step to determining whether the invention
violated the portion of article 53(a) concerning morality. In
particular, the Board noted that the invention would violate this
provision if exploitation of the invention is "not in conformity with
the conventionally accepted standards" of "European society and
civilization. 85 However, the Board then abandoned application of
this definition in its evaluation of the invention at issue. Instead of
determining the "conventionally accepted standards," the Board
compared the claimed invention to other patented but non-
objectionable subject matter and thus announced the outer boundaries
of what would be considered sufficiently immoral to preclude
patentability. The Board declared that "[i]t would undoubtedly be
against 'ordre public' or morality to propose a misuse or a destructive
use of technology." 86 However, because traditional plant breeding
could have accomplished the same end result achieved by the
invention, the Board did not consider the patent a misuse or
destructive use of technology. 87 Moreover, the Board characterized
plant genetic engineering such as PGS's invention to be a "tool,"
similar to any other tool with both potential positive and negative
purposes.88 Thus, pursuant to this approach, as long as an invention
84. Id at 558 (citing the Onco-mouse and Lubrizol decisions for the proposition that
exceptions are narrowly interpreted).
85. PGS, 1995 O.J. EPO at 557. The Board stated that morality is "related" to certain
beliefs about what behavior is proper, such beliefs being founded on deeply rooted norms. Id.
86. Id. at 563.
87. Id. at 563-64. In particular, the Board noted that "plant biotechnology per se cannot be
regarded as being more contrary to morality than traditional selective breeding because both ...
are guided by the same motivation, namely to change the property of a plant .... Id. at 562,
The Board explained that genetically engineered plants were distinguishable in that they
utilized more powerful and accurate techniques of genetic modifications in comparison to
traditional plant breeding. Id.
88. PGS, 1995 O.J. EPO at 562,563.
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does not have a solely destructive use, the morality provision of
article 53(a) will not bar patentability.
(2) Ordre Public
Addressing the definition of "ordre public," the Board first noted
that it considered it to be "generally accepted that the concept of
'ordre public' covers the protection of public security and the
physical integrity of individuals as part of society," including the
"protection of the environment."89 The Board further stated that
inventions that would violate such a standard would be those "likely
to breach public peace or social order (for example, through acts of
terrorism) or to seriously prejudice the environment." 90 In addition,
the Board noted that the requisite serious prejudice to the
environment would need to be "sufficiently substantiated." 91 The
Board suggested that without sufficient evidence of "actual
disadvantages," a balancing test pursuant to Onco-mouse was
unnecessary. 92 Moreover, even assuming such sufficient evidence
exists, the Board agreed with the Opposition Division in that a
balancing test was not the only method of determining an article
53(a) violation.93
In this case, the Board concurred with the Opposition Division
that there was no conclusive evidence to establish serious prejudice.94
The Board found that surveys and opinion polls do not necessarily
reflect ordre public or moral norms; rather, they were more likely to
reflect specific interests, particularly in cases such as this where the
surveys were of a particular group of people.95 The Board deemed
survey evidence and opinion polls based on citizens of a single
nation, or some subset of that nation, to be nonprobative of whether
article 53(a) was violated; in particular, it noted that to be denied a
89. Id. at 557.
90. Id.
91. Id. at566.
92. Id. at 569.
93. Id. The Board stated that "a 'balancing exercise' is not the only way of assessing
patentability with regard to Article 53(a) EPC, but just one possible way.... "PGS, 1995 O.J.
EPO at 557. See also Plant Genetic Systems, supra note 57, at 618.
94. Id.
95. PGS, 1995 O.J. EPO at 561.
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patent pursuant to article 53(a), an invention had to violate ordre
public in all member states.96 Moreover, even if the surveys and
opinion polls had been reflective of all the member states, that still
may not be enough to establish a violation of ordre public as the
Board deemed such information inherently subject to control and
influence.
97
(3) Policy Issues
The above determinations were grounded on the Board's view of
patent policy and how the patent office should relate to other
governmental bodies. In determining that the invention did not
violate ordre public, the Board repeatedly noted that a patent did not
allow an invention to be exploited without regard to other laws and
regulations. 98 In particular, the Board stated that:
A patent does not amount per se to an authorisation to exploit
the invention claimed in the patent. For the latter regulatory
approval must be obtained. Should the competent authorities
and bodies, after having definitively assessed the risks
involved, prohibit the exploitation of the invention, the
patented subject matter could not be exploited anyhow. If,
however, regulatory approval is given based on the finding that
no risks or minimal risks are involved, then patent protection
should be available. 99
In the Board's view, regulatory authorities and bodies should
govern properly the exploitation of technology; it noted that assessing
hazards of exploiting technology was one of the important duties of
such authorities and bodies.100 Moreover, the Board explained that
96. Id. In this case, PGS's survey of Swedish farmers regarding their views on herbicide-
resistant crops and an opinion poll on transgenic life only reflected opinions in Switzerland and
provided no more than information concerning a national law regulating a particular activity. Id,
at 560-61.
97. Id.at561.
98. See id. at 564 (noting that "the invention claimed in a patent may only be exploited
within the framework defined by national laws and regulations regarding the use of the said
invention).
99. Id. at 568-69.
100. Id. at565.
[Vol. 2:247
HeinOnline  -- 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 268 2000
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/9
Splicing Morality and Patent Law
any attempt to evaluate the risks of a technology during the patent
process would be inherently flawed because potential risks could not
be determined from a patent application.'01 The Board stated that
realistic assessments of effectiveness are usually time-intensive and
not available to patent offices during the pendency of a patent
application. 10 2 The Board considered other specialized authorities to
be in a better position to carry out assessment of risks.'0 3 In addition,
the Board seemed unconcerned with Greenpeace's arguments
because regulations existed that applied to the patented invention.
0 4
However, the Board noted the important point that even in the event
that regulations contained inadequacies, the EPO would nonetheless
be without authority to step into the shoes of a regulatory authority or
body. 05
3. Relaxin's Isolated Human Gene
Similarly, in the case of a patent concerning an isolated gene
taken from a pregnant woman, the Opposition Division found article
53(a) inapplicable. The Green Party objected to the patent for several
reasons under article 53(a): the use of pregnancy for profit was
offensive to "human dignity"; the applicant was involved in
"patenting life"; and the patenting was tantamount to slavery.10 6
Accordingly, the Green Party requested that the patent be revoked in
its entirety.
0 7
Before addressing the specific objections of the Green Party, the
101. PGS, 1995 O.1. EPO at 561.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 565-66 (citing EC Directives 901219 EEC and 90/220/EEC as examples).
105. Id. at 568.
106. Relaxin, 1995 O.J. EPO at 397-98. The application was also opposed on other
grounds, namely, that it constituted a discovery rather than an invention and that there was no
novelty. Id. at 389.
107. Id. In addition, the Green Party also requested that the EPO carry out a referendum to
determine whether the public desired the invention to be patented, but the Opposition Division
refused the request. Id. at 403. In doing so the Opposition Division noted that the opponent
bears the burden of proof in opposition proceedings and, thus, could conduct such a survey on
its own if desired. Id. Moreover, the Opposition Division clarified that the EPC does not require
affirmative approval from the public to allow patentability since under such a standard the
number of patents would arguably be "decimated." Id.
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Opposition Division first stressed the limited applicability of article
53(a). It began its discussion by noting that "[t]he provisions of
Article 53(a) have only very seldom been invoked. ' 8 Like other
boards and divisions who previously reviewed this provision, it noted
that article 53(a) exists only to ensure that patents are not granted for
inventions that would "universally be regarded as outrageous."'0 9 The
Opposition Division quoted the EPO Guidelines for the relevant test
to apply-whether it is likely that the "public in general" would
consider the invention "so abhorrent" that patent rights would be
"inconceivable."'" 0 Moreover, it noted that there is a general
presumption of patentability to which article 53(a) is an exception
that must be construed narrowly like all other exceptions."'
In dismissing all of the Green Party's objections, the Opposition
Division clarified that the objections were largely misplaced. For
example, the tissue was donated and the Draft Bioethics Convention
of the Council of Europe explicitly approved its use in the
invention. 12 In addition, the Opposition Division noted that DNA is a
chemical substance containing genetic information, not "life" itself
and, thus, not grounds for an objection to patenting life."' Finally,
the Opposition Division clarified that the objections based on slavery
"betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the effects of a patent"
since a patent right does not grant an affirmative right to use and,
moreover, would not give any rights over a human being in this
instance."
4
The Opposition Division also took the opportunity to comment on
application of article 53(a) in general. It noted that "whether or not
human genes should be patented is a controversial issue on which
many persons have strong opinions [, but] ... the EPO is not the right
institution to decide fundamental ethical questions."".5 In fact, the
108. Relaxin, 1995 O.J. EPO at 398.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 399.
113. Seeid. at400.
114. Id. at 399-400.
115. Relaxin, 1995 O.J. EPO at 402-03. The Opposition Division noted that, contrary to the
suggestion of Greenpeace, there is no consensus on whether gene patents are inappropriate. Id.
at 402. In support of this argument, the Opposition Division noted the disagreement among the
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Opposition Division concluded that "the opinion of society on the
question of patenting human genes is complex and not yet definitely
formed."'1 6 Therefore, applying the same standard as the PGS Board,
it held that the invention did not violate article 53(a) because there
was clearly no "overwhelming consensus" that exploitation or
publication of the invention would be immoral."1
7
4. Novartis's Transgenic Plant
Article 53(a) was most recently discussed in the December 20,
1999 decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeals in In re Novartis."8
In this case, article 53(a) was not technically an issue that was before
the court; the Enlarged Board was addressing questions referred to it
by the Technical Board of Appeal, seeking clarification on how to
interpret article 53(b). 119 Although Greenpeace submitted objections
to patentability based upon article 53(a), the Enlarged Board
explicitly found article 53(a) outside the scope of the referred
questions. 20 Nonetheless, the Enlarged Board discussed article 53(a)
in the context of its article 53(b) analysis, thereby providing the first-
ever interpretation of article 53(a) by an Enlarged Board.
The Enlarged Board first reiterated that there existed a "general
principle of patentability," thereby implying that an exception such as
article 53(a) should be interpreted narrowly.121 In addition, the
Enlarged Board noted that "[t]he EPO has not been vested with the
task of taking into account the economic effects of the grant of
EU regarding the Biotechnology Directive and the "turbulent state of the public debate on
biotechnology." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.at403.
118. Transgenic Plant/Novartis II, G 001/98 (EPO Enlarged Bd. App. 1999), reprinted at
<http://www.european-patent-office.org/clg3/pdf/g986001exl.pdf>, at *1 [hereinafter Novartis
1H]. The Board was comprised of: Chairman Messerli and members Teschemacher, Davies,
Jestaedt, Lancon, Saisset, and van den Berg.
119. Transgenic Plant/Novartis, T 1054/96-3.3.4, 1998 O.J. EPO 511 (1997), reprinted in
I.I.C. 78 (1999). See also Robin Not, The Novartis Case in the EPO, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 33 (1999); Ingeborg Voelker, Europe Won't Reverse Controversial EPO Ruling, IP
WORLDWIDE, July-Aug. 1997, available at <http://www.ljx.com/patents/7-8europe.html>. The
EPO had similarly rejected the application on the basis of article 53(b). See Novartis II, supra
note 118, at *6.
120. Novaris1,fsupra note 118, at *30.
121. See id. (citing Decision G 05/83, 1995 O.J. EPO 64).
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patents in specific areas and of restricting the field of patentable
subject-matter accordingly."' 22 The Enlarged Board explained that
[a]lthough the positions adopted in society on genetic
engineering are controversial, there is no consensus in the
Contracting States condemning genetic engineering in the
development of plants under the above criteria [i.e., that the
publication of exploitation of the invention is contrary to ordre
public or morality]. On the contrary, the Directive ...
establishes that promotion of innovation in this field is
considered necessary in Europe.1
23
The Enlarged Board's opinion is particularly notable because it
provides, for the first time, that evaluations under article 53(a) should
be viewed with regard to the claimed invention, rather than an
abstract conception of the invention. To explain this important
distinction, the Enlarged Board applied its approach to a hypothetical
invention concerning an improved copying machine. 124 The Enlarged
Board explained that article 53(a) would not necessarily preclude
patentability merely because one embodiment contained unclaimed
features that would enable counterfeiting money.125 In particular, it
stated that there is "no reason to consider the copying machine as
claimed to be excluded since its improved properties could be used
for many acceptable purposes.'
126
While the clarification that claims should be the focus of analysis
for applying article 53(a) is undoubtedly valuable, the brief
discussion by the Enlarged Board on this issue is unlikely to resolve
all future difficulties with applying article 53(a). For example, the
opinion left several obvious open questions such as whether article
53(a) would bar patentability if an arguably immoral embodiment of
an invention were actually disclosed in the patent application itself
along with non-objectionable embodiments. 2 7 The focus on the
122. Id. Furthermore, the Enlarged Board stated that the potential of using a patent to
restrict access to important breeding material was very limited. Id. at *3 1.
123. Id. at *30-31 (citation omitted).
124. Novartisf1, supra note 118, at *21-22.
125. Id. at *22.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 22 (addressing only the case where counterfeiting would be "apparent" to a
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claimed invention would seem to suggest that so long as only the
unobjectionable matter were claimed, the application would be
deemed patentable under article 53(a). However, even a claims-based
focus may require an exclusion of the objectionable use to avoid an
article 53(a) issue. Additionally, a more difficult question not
addressed in Novartis is whether article 53(a) would preclude
patentability where an invention has solely objectionable or illegal
uses in one or more of the EPC countries.
Regardless of these unresolved issues, the Novartis approach is
likely to be heartily applied by courts who heretofore had no real
standard to apply. Although courts repeatedly emphasized that article
53(a) should be narrowly interpreted, they seemed to struggle with
how to do so. However, the Novartis case now presents a framework
with which the EPO and its courts are much more familiar-the
claimed invention. Accordingly, it would not be surprising for the
EPO to use the Novartis case to limit application of article 53(a).
However, even though it may do so, there may still be some
inconsistency, depending on how the claims are interpreted. As noted
above, the Novartis case does leave some open issues. In addition, the
EPO has previously struggled with attempting to narrowly apply
exclusions from patentability even when it is utilizing a claims-based
focus. 128 Moreover, a fundamental problem remains even after the
Novartis case since the approach articulated in Novartis appears to
gloss over the language in article 53(a) that requires that patents be
skilled person and accordingly perhaps excluding situations where counterfeiting was actually
not just apparent, but explicitly disclosed in the application).
128. For example, the EPO has struggled with application of the EPC bar to patenting
methods of medical treatment, which are precluded as per se lacking industrial application
under EPC article 52(4). Although the language of the exclusion is clear, the EPO has
nonetheless allowed some patents in this area by narrowly interpreting the claims and
interpreting what conditions constitute illness and therapy within this rule. See, e.g., T 329/94,
Blood Extraction Method, 1998 O.J. EPO 241, reprinted in 29 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYWRIGT L. 694 (1998) (finding that blood extraction method was not precluded from
patentability under article 52(4) because there was no therapeutic purpose or effect where the
purpose was to improve the "efficiency of taking blood from a donor"); Trigonelline, T 143/94-
33.2, 1996 O.J. EPO 430, reprinted in 28 I.I.C. 95 (1997) (finding no prohibition from
patentability under article 52(4) for a claim directed to the use of a composition in the
production of a compound, even if the compound would have a therapeutic use); Contraceptive
Method/British Technology Group, T 74/93-3.3.1, 1995 O.J. EPO 712, reprinted in 27 I.I.C. 99
(1996) (finding patent on a method of contraception not excluded under article 52(4) because
pregnancy is not an illness, and its prevention is not therapy).
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barred for the commercial exploitation of an invention that violates
ordre public or morality. Because the claimed invention may not be
equivalent to commercial exploitation, it could be argued that the
Novartis approach is inadequate, albeit tempting to apply.
III. FUTURE FRAMEWORKS FOR CONSIDERING MORALITY
A. Beyond the EPC
In addition to the EPC model for incorporating morality into
patent laws, there are two additional frameworks to consider. These
additional frameworks, the TRIPS Agreement and the Biotechnology
Directive, 129 are referred to as "future frameworks" because their
application is yet to occur. Although these future frameworks contain
similar language to EPC article 53(a), there is presently no case law
concerning their application. A comparison of the language of each
of these frameworks easily illustrates that they essentially add to EPC
article 53(a), rather than create a new approach. Moreover, the TRIPS
framework does not actually create any laws-it mandates that all
countries who adhere to its requirements provide patent protection,
with the important caveat that they may elect to exclude subject
matter from patentability on the basis of article 53(a)-type
concerns. 130 At this point however, the TRIPS framework offers little
guidance other than its definitional interpretation of ordre public.
The Biotechnology directive, on the other hand, although not yet
applied, does provide a supplemental framework beyond the EPC.
Although the Biotechnology Directive is intended to be based upon
the EPC and includes almost identical language, it goes beyond the
EPC framework by setting forth specific categories of inventions
129. Council Directive 98/44 on Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998
OJ. (L 213) 13. The EU, a union of nations (presently fifteen countries), was founded to further
political, economic, and social cooperation; formerly, the EU was known as the European
Community (EC) or the European Economic Community (EEC). Unlike the EPC, the EU
governs many facets of national law through a governmental structure including a Parliament,
Council, and Commission that roughly represent branches of an executive government. These
EU bodies can require member states to take actions through the issuance of regulations
(immediately and directly binding on member states) or directives (binding as to result only and
usually not immediately effective).
130. See TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 27.
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which per se violate EPC article 53(a). Accordingly, it is useful to
analyze the Directive to examine the utility of a categorical exclusion
of certain inventions, rather than the amorphous standard of article
53(a).131 However, before explaining the text of the enacted
Directive, a brief history of its path towards enactment will be
provided to provide a full picture; this is particularly important
because issues of morality were not contemplated when the Directive
was first proposed.
B. The EU Directive on Patenting Biotechnology
A directive concerning patent protection for biotechnology was
first conceived to provide uniformity in the area of patenting
biotechnology; this in turn was intended to foster overall innovation
within the European Community by ensuring the uniform application
and interpretation of laws. 32 Issues relating to morality were actually
not included in the initial proposal. 33 The original proposal attempted
to clarify that living matter such as biotechnology could be patentable
if it met the technical qualifications of patentability. 134 However, the
initial proposal was severely criticized for failing to address issues of
morality despite the fact that the Directive was intended to
supplement the EPC such that article 53(a) of the EPC could
nonetheless bar patentability, without inclusion of the identical
language in the Directive. 135 The omission of morality from the initial
proposal was the primary reason for the initial proposal's demise.
Moreover, disagreements concerning whether morality should be
addressed and how to address it within the directive loomed large
during the ten year process towards enactment of the final
131. Compare id. with EPC, article 53(a), supra note 35, at 286. See Directive, supra note
36, at 16. See also TRIPS, supra note 33, art. 6, at 18-19.
132. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, 1989 O.J. (C 10) 6, passim [hereinafter Initial Proposed
Directive]. See also Biotechnology in the Community, COM(83)672 final at E3, E5 (noting the
necessity of taking actions designed to "stimulate biotechnology in the Community and to
increase competitiveness in Europe's bio-industries").
133. See Initial Proposed Directive, supra note 132.
134. Seeid.
135. Although membership in the EPC and EU are not identical, the overlap is substantial.
In addition, because all members of the EU are members of the EPC, the EPC requirements
would govern EU member states as well as any regulations or directive issued by the EU.
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Directive."'
The enacted Biotechnology directive is based upon the EPC.
Patents may be precluded if the commercial exploitation of an
invention would violate "ordre public" or "morality" regardless of
whether the standard patentability requirements are satisfied.1
37
Although the Directive and the EPC differ slightly with regard to the
type of exploitation that would invoke the prohibition-the EPC
requires exploitation while the Directive specifies "commercial
exploitation-the difference is minimal since the EPO has enactd
regulations that incorporate the EU requirement into the EPC.1
3 1
The Directive, however, goes beyond the EPC and prior
interpretations of the EPC, in dictating what constitutes subject
matter that violates ordre public or morality in the area of
biotechnology. In particular, the EU Directive sets forth four
categories of subject matter which are considered per se violations
and accordingly unpatentable:
136. The Initial Draft Directive was proposed in 1988 and, despite substantial amendments,
was finally rejected in 1995. See Decision on the Joint Text Approved by the Conciliation
Committee for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, 1995 O.J. (C 68) 26. For additional discussion of the problems
encountered in enactment of the directive, see, e.g., Nigel Jones, The New Draft Biotechnology
Directive, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 163 -(1996) (discussing 1995 proposed directive and
whether it adequately addressed ethical issues); Joseph Straus, Patenting Human Genes in
Europe-Past Developments and Prospects for the Future, 26 I.I.C. 920, 942-46 (1995)
(discussing provisions of the draft directive that encountered opposition on grounds that they
failed to adequately address ethical issues).
137. Compare EPC, art. 53(a), supra note 35, at 286 with Directive, supra note 36, art. 6, at
18-19. The language of the final Directive is actually more aligned with article 27(2) of the
TRIPS Agreement, which allows (but does not require) contracting members to prohibit from
patentability inventions whose commercial exploitation would interfere with ordre public or
morality. Compare Directive, supra note 36, art. 6, at 18-19, with TRIPS, supra note 33, art.
27(2), at 94 (stating "[m]embers may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre
public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the
exploitation is prohibited by their law").
138. Notice Dated 1 July 1999 Concerning the Amendment of and Implementing
Regulations to the European Patent Convention, 1999 O.J. EPO 573 [hereinafter EPO Biotech
Regulations). Although the members of the EPC and the EU are not identical, there is
substantial overlap. See, e.g., EPO Member States (visited Mar. 13, 2000)
<http:llwww.european-patent-office.orglepo/members.htm>; Information on the European
Union (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.cali.co.uk/bisleurope.htm>. Therefore, EPC
member states are either directly bound to comply with the Directive or will be indirectly
impacted as patents sought through the EPO will be issued according to the same standards.
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(a) Processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of
human beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial
purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which are likely to cause them suffering without any
substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals
resulting from such processes. 1
39
Although the Directive enumerates these specific examples, they
are intended to include all possible inventions that might violate the
morality provision. In particular, the preamble states that the directive
merely provides an "illustrative list of inventions excluded from
patentability[, and that] ... this list obviously cannot presume to be
exhaustive.' ' 40 Rather, the examples were intended to provide some
guidance to national courts and patent offices in determining what
violates ordre public and morality. 141
1. Applying the Directive to the Newman Application
An attempt to apply the Directive to the facts of the Newman
application highlights some of the inherent problems with the
Directive. First, the invention disclosed in the Newman application
does not necessarily fall within the categories that are now considered
to be explicitly in violation of ordre public and morality. In fact, in
attempting to determine which category, if any, the application falls
within, the ambiguity of the provision is highlighted.
For example, although there is a ban on patenting use of embryos,
the ban relates to uses of embryos for "industrial or commercial
139. See Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(2), at 18-19. In addition, although not within the
text of the Directive itself, other examples set forth in the preamble may be considered to also
be in violation of the ordre public and morality standard. For example, the preamble states that
situations that might offend human dignity "are obviously also excluded from patentability." Id.
at 16. In particular, the preamble notes that a process to produce chimeras from germ cells or
totipotent cells of humans and animals would offend human dignity. Id.
140. Id. at 16.
141. See id.
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purposes" only.142 It is unclear whether the Newman application
would be barred under this provision because it is unknown whether
the commercial use must be one that is disclosed in the application,
or whether there must be an intent to use the invention commercially.
Moreover, pursuant to the Novartis approach, perhaps the only
relevant inquiry is whether the claimed invention could be used for
commercial purposes. However, even that inquiry is not definitive
because it remains unclear whether this is determined as of the time
of the filing, or at the time of opposition, or some other yet to be
determined time period. In addition, it is unclear whether this
provision would bar patentability of an application that disclosed
several uses, only one of which was considered "commercial." Again,
under the Novartis approach, patentability could conceivably be a
possibility so long as only the non-commercial embodiment was
claimed.
It is also unclear whether a process of creating a chimera would
constitute a "process[] for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which [is] likely to cause them suffering without any substantial
medical benefit to man or animal. 143 First, it is unclear whether the
chimera is the modification of an existing animal or the creation of a
new being outside the scope of this provision. Second, it is unclear
how a determination could be made as to whether this multi-cellular
creation would be likely to suffer. Would this inquiry only be
considered at the time of creation of the chimeric embryo, or also
considered with respect to the adult version of the chimeric embryo?
The answer to this question might have substantial bearing on the
outcome of the morality calculus, as it has been postulated that
chimeric beings might be categorized as a sub-human species and
thus considered to "suffer." 144 On the other hand, such beings could
also be considered to be of "substantial medical benefit" as means for
growing necessary transplant organs and enabling research that
would be considered unethical for "real" humans. 45 Of course, the
142. See id. art. 6(2)(c), at 18.
143. See Directive, supra note 36, art. 6(2)(d), at 19.
144. See supra note 20.
145. The Newman application cites socially beneficially uses. See Dickson, supra note 3, at
424 (noting socially beneficial uses of the invention). It is also unclear whether a "substantial"
medical benefit is intended to require something more than the benefit-shown in the Onco-
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word "substantial" raises issues of application since the term is
undefined. The Onco-mouse analysis will not necessarily be of utility
here as the Onco-mouse test did not include this requirement. Finally,
it is unclear whether the substantial benefit must be actual or whether
it may be probable.
Even if the Newman application does not fall squarely within any
of the categorical exclusions, it could still be prohibited under the
EPC or the Biotechnology Directive. In addition to the general
prohibition under article 53(a), the preamble to the Biotechnology
Directive contains language that appears directed to the Newman
application. The preamble states that "process, the uses of which
offend against human dignity, such as processes to produce chimeras
from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals, are
obviously also excluded from patentability." 146 In addition, the EPO
has stated that the Biotechnology Directive may be referred to as a
supplemental source in evaluating EPC article 53(a).147 On the other
hand, this language is not directly incorporated into the EPC
regulations as the EPO only specifically incorporated the articles of
the Biotechnology Directive. In addition, although the preamble
declares such processes to be obviously excluded, the failure to
include them in the categorical list may also lend credence to the
argument that there may not be sufficient objection to constitute a
violation of article 53(a). Just as the EPO Boards have questioned
public opinion polls, so to may they question a preamble that is not
necessarily reflective of ordre public.
Perhaps the more important issue, however, is that even if
commercial exploitation of an invention might violate ordre public or
morality (either as a per se category or based on application of the
article 53(a) provision), there is not necessarily a bar to patentability
if the approach of the Novartis Board is adopted. Accordingly, if the
offensive use were either not claimed, or not the only use of an
invention, the EPO could avoid article 53(a) issues. This would
mouse case where the court was using a balancing test that merely required a benefit to humans
or animals.
146. Directive, supra note 36, at 16.
147. See EPO Biotech Regulations, supra note 138, Rule 23(b), at 576 (noting that for
applications concerning biotechnological inventions, the Biotechnology Directive shall be used
as a "supplementary means" of interpreting the EPC).
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enable the EPO to avoid the difficult question of determining issues
that it clearly feels ill-equipped to address. EPO courts have
repeatedly emphasized that the function of the patent office is to
grant patents, rather than to regulate technology, and have declined to
rely on article 53(a) to deny patentability. 48 In addition, this would
be consistent with the EPO position that the EPO is not the proper
institution to decide ethical questions because a patent is not a moral
instrument.'49
However, the fact that the invention as claimed does not violate
ordre public in the eyes of the EPC is unlikely to prevent those who
object to genetic engineering from protesting. As is clear from the
case law to date, third parties such as Greenpeace and Green Party
are not novices to invoking Opposition proceedings. Moreover, they
seem undeterred by repeated statements that patents do not confer an
affirmative right to use. To avoid endless opposition proceedings, the
EPO may also allow applications to lie dormant indefinitely without
action, in the hopes that issues concerning morality will be resolved
in other arenas. The EPO may be particularly reluctant to issue
controversial biotechnology patents since it recently was subject to
extreme protests over the issuance of a patent. In particular,
Greenpeace activists recently stormed the EPO concerning a patent
that issued with claims that could include human cloning.1
50
2. Additional Interpretive Issues
Ironically, although the political realities in the EU required
inclusion of an ethical component, 15  the enactment of these
148. See supra Part II.
149. See Relaxin, 1995 O.3. EPO at 403.
150. See, e.g., Philip Shishkin, Greenpeace Protests Europe's Gene Study Patent, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 23, 2000 (noting that the EPO Munich headquarters came under siege); Greenpeace
Paralyzes Patent Office In Genetic Engineering Protest, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 22,
2000, available in Lexis, Nexis library, News File (noting that Greenpeace activists shut down
the EPO by bricking up the entrance and provided a written statement declaring that "[w]e shut
down the EPO to prevent it from granting patents on living organisms as long as possible" and
criticizing the EPO for its practice of patenting "living beings").
151. See Robin Nott, "You Did It!:" The European Biotechnology Directive at Last, 9 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 347, 349 (1998) (noting that "it was probably inevitable" that the
exclusions under article 6(2) would be included in order to get necessary consensus for the
Directive's approval).
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exclusions appears to undermine the initial purpose of the Directive,
which was to ensure certainty and uniformity in the patent protection
of biotechnological inventions.1 52  In particular, uncertainty will
prevail because it is unknown how the categories will be interpreted.
Moreover, even if the categories could be interpreted clearly and
uniformly, the EU Directive will not necessarily foster development
of biotechnology, as intended, because it clearly excludes certain
subject matter from patentability and does so permanently, rather
than on a case-by-case basis.
In addition, the categories will continue to be declared
unpatentable, regardless of whether they in fact continue to violate
ordre public or morality. Commentators familiar with patent law have
uniformly noted that the per se exclusions are problematic; although
they are intended to clarify what is immoral, the per se categories
result in unchangeable exclusions regardless of future
developments. 53 Moreover, while it may be easy to legislatively
exclude subject matter from patentability, the reverse is not
necessarily true.'54 This is an inherent problem with exclusions based
152. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
153. Ironically, although germ line gene therapy may presently be considered immoral, if it
became more socially acceptable and even something expected it might be considered
"immoral" to deny a person access to it. See Margaret Llewelyn, Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions: An Alternative Approach, 3 EIJR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 115, 122
(1997) ("Scientific developments will inevitably be made leading to changes in what society
will accept as being morally correct in the context of biotechnology and what it will not. It is
difficult to support an immutable statement of what can never be regarded as patentable in the
light of this.").
154. For example, it is recognized that the prohibition against patenting plant varieties
under EPC article 53(b) came into existence because of a requirement under a different law for
providing plant variety protection that precluding protection under two separate systems. See,
e g., Novartis 11, supra note 118, at *23-29 (describing history of EPC prohibition on plant
varieties, including prior prohibition under the Strasbourg Convention which the EPC is based
upon); E.g. VAN DE GRAF, PATENT LAW AND MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY 85-86 (1997)
(describing development of EPC article 53(b)). However, although that law was amended in
1991 to allow dual protection for plant varieties, the EPC bar remains. VAN DE GRAF, supra, at
91-94 (discussing both the political problem of amending article 53(b) and how courts have
attempted to narrow the applicability of the provision). Accordingly, courts have struggled to
interpret the EPC in a manner that is consistent with its literal meaning while recognizing
present day realities and the purpose of the patent system. See id. See also Robin Nott, The
Novartis Case in the EPO, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 33 (1999); Ulrich Schatz, Patentability
of Genetic Engineering Inventions in European Patent Office Practice, 28 I.I.C. 2, 8-9 (1998)
(noting confusion among the EPO courts regarding whether transgenic plants are denied
patentability by article 53(b)); Ingeborg Voelker, Europe Won't Reverse Controversial EPO
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on morality concerns since perceptions of morality fluctuate over
time. Although a new Directive could theoretically be proposed and
enacted to address such changes, considering that the present
Biotechnology Directive took ten years to develop and still elicited
legal objections, such changes are not promising.
C. Implications for the United States
The evolution of the morality preclusion demonstrates that
including a morality component into the patentability scheme is
analogous to opening a Pandora's box. Although an EPO court first
mandated consideration of article 53(a) issues to respond to public
concerns, it is unclear whether the court would have done so if it had
known that the provision would subsequently become a battleground
for opponents of biotechnology.
155
In addition, even if morality should be considered in the context
of patentability, an exclusion based on commercial exploitation of the
patented invention, as required under the EPC, the EU Directive, and
TRIPS is problematic. The patent office would not have information
regarding commercial exploitation of an invention since that
information is not necessary to establish any of the requirements of
patentability, as noted by several EPO boards struggling to determine
Ruling, IP WORLDWIDE, July/Aug. 1997 (discussing inconsistency of EPO decisions
concerning the patentability of transgenic plants).
155. It should be noted that some of the negative impacts of article 53(a) would not be
directly applicable to the United States because the United States does not provide third parties
with an opportunity to oppose patents in the same manner, the only post-issuance proceeding
provided by the PTO is re-examination of a patent based on new prior art. Although third
parties may challenge the validity of patents in a judicial proceeding, the standing requirement
essentially means that only defendants who are likely to be sued can do so. See, e.g., C.R. Bard,
Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that there must be a reasonable
threat that a patentee will bring an infringement suit against the alleged infringer in order for the
alleged infringer to have standing to sue for a declaratory judgment); cf Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that farmers, husbandry groups,
and organizations did not have standing to seek a declaration that animals are not patentable
subject matter and an injunction against the issuance of animal patents). For additional
discussion of this case, see David Burke, Note, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: Renewed
Challenge to Animal Patents, 59 UMKC L. REV. 409 (1991); Elizabeth Joy Hecht, Note,
Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy over Transgenic Animal
Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023 (1992).
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whether there was an article 53(a) violation.156 Even if applicants
were required to submit information concerning commercial
exploitation, this could be unrealistic if not impossible, because
patent applications are generally filed before commercial applications
are known. Moreover, if an applicant waited until commercial
applications were known, entitlement to a patent could be
compromised as the invention might no longer satisfy the novelty
requirement.
157
Determining morality within the patent office is also problematic
since morality is not within the technical capacity of present patent
examiners. Patent examiners are generally scientists or engineers who
have a technical background in the subject matter of the invention.
They are required to have such a background as a condition of
employment, but experience with issues of morality is not typically
expected. In addition, EPO experiences indicate that such individuals
likely feel ill-at-ease in making such decisions. Moreover, there is the
inherent problem in that what constitutes an ethical invention is
typically not a decision upon which parties would agree, thus creating
problems with uniformity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ethical and moral issues will inevitably arise in the exploitation of
inventions. The more fundamental question, however, is how they
should be addressed. This Article has attempted to demonstrate that
grafting a morality provision into the patent laws results in an
unstable merger. Although morality must be considered pursuant to
EPC article 53(a) in determining patentability, the case law shows
that consideration is at best cursory. Moreover, even if the EPO, or
any patent office, were to take a more thorough evaluation of
156. The patent laws contain no requirement for disclosure of such information. The only
requirement that might relate to commercial application would be the utility requirement.
However, this does not demand commercial utility and only considers whether there is at least
one utility. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, 64
Fed. Reg. 71,440 (1999) (noting that a claimed invention must have a specific utility but no
more than that). Therefore, it is conceivable that an invention could satisfy the utility
requirement and yet have other applications that might be considered offensive.
157. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); EPC, art. 52, supra note 35, at 285-86.
20001
HeinOnline  -- 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 283 2000
Washington University Open Scholarship
Re-Engineering Patent Law
morality, it is unlikely that all parties could ever be satisfied since
issues of morality are inherently controversial.
The European experience demonstrates that as a practical matter,
incorporating morality into the patent system is a challenge for every
institutional actor with the system. The limited EPO case law, as well
as the actual EPO decisions, underscore a reluctance to determine
what constitutes an immoral invention that would bar patentability.
The reluctance of patent examiners-trained to evaluate the technical
merits of inventions-to evaluate morality is not surprising. On the
other hand, granting controversial patents in the face of a mandatory
morality consideration appears to have made the EPO a victim of
special interest groups who are critical of biotechnology.
Moreover, the long history of the EU Biotechnology Directive
demonstrates the difficulty in addressing the problems through a
legislative approach. To reach a consensus, there must be agreement
both on the fact that morality should be considered in a patent
context, as well as what the consideration should entail; legislation
may be stalled by the difficulties in articulating what objectionable
matter should be deemed patentable. Although the EU did eventually
enact a directive that incorporated a morality component, the
compromise directive is not ideal for any party and may actually
create more uncertainty and controversy.
Whether a new model can be crafted to adequately incorporate
morality into the patent laws is questionable. First, it is notable that
despite substantial consideration of this issue, the EU was reluctant to
part entirely with the EPC system; rather, the EU adopted the EPC
morality provision wholesale and merely added some per se
exclusions. However, the EU formulation is any more effective than
the original system under the EPC. In some ways, the EU formulation
may in fact be less preferable because it introduces inflexible
definitions of immoral and unpatentable inventions. Second, even
assuming that a workable and appropriate framework could be
envisioned, the type of in-depth consideration necessary prior to
developing such a fundamental change to the patent system would
inevitably lag behind the progression of technology and the issuance
of controversial patents.
Although the patent laws, and particularly EPC article 53(a), have
provided a forum for venting concerns about new applications of
[Vol. 2:247
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biotechnology, the alleged problem with patenting such inventions
should perhaps be re-examined. In large part, the root of articulated
concerns can not be solved by addressing the patent system in
isolation. As repeatedly pointed out by commentators, the denial of a
patent does not eliminate all incentives to utilize an invention.
Although a patent may accelerate or at least foster development of an
invention, the grant or denial of a patent does not address the
fundamental concern with the use of certain technology. Patents are
at best a blunt tool to regulate controversial matter because patents
are not necessary to utilize or commercialize innovations.
Accordingly, the focus on patents is an incomplete one. The issue of
whether researching or using biotechnology is ethical can and should
be separated from the patenting question, which tends to conflate
divergent issues.
Even if ethics were to be incorporated in the United States' patent
laws, further study of the purpose of such an exclusion, as well as
how that impacts the patent system, would have to be considered.
Because the foundation of the patent laws lies in the constitutional
mandate to promote the progress of useful arts, the question of
considering morality must also be considered in that context.
Namely, would considering morality further the goal of promoting
the progress in useful arts? Not only does this require a consideration
of constitutional interpretation and policy, but it also requires a
consideration of the effect on the patent system of excluding arguably
unethical inventions. Only if that question were answered in the
affirmative should efforts then be directed to addressing what ethical
considerations should be included within the patent system, and when
such considerations should be made. Until that time, however, any
temptation to incorporate morality into the U.S. patent laws should be
tempered with the reality that a change to the patent laws may just
create new issues to address, rather than addressing the issues that
currently exist.
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